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RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The shareholder need not show a financial injury to maintain his cause
of action, for such a requirement would frustrate the enforcement of the
proxy solicitation rules.35 Moreover, the two anti-fraud provisions of
the Securities Act usually lend support to one another as the shareholder
is increasingly given more protection. An unfortunate consequence of the
judiciary's continued support of minority shareholders is evidenced by the
power that they possess to control the outcome of corporate activities.
Indeed, the day looms near when a corporation may stand at the mercy
of one insignificant, discontented shareholder. 6 The corporate merger has
become at best a tenuous relationship. As a matter of public policy, per-
haps some degree of protection should be given a corporate merger already
consummated. Indeed, the judiciary should possibly reconsider their
interpretation of the Securities Act.
E. L. KITTRELL SMITH
Torts-Mental Distress Damages for Racial Discrimination
In Massachuwetts Commission Against Discrimination v. Franzaroha
the Commission Against Discrimination' found that Mandred Henry, a
Negro, had been denied an apartment by the defendants solely because of
his race. The commission ordered cessation of defendants' discriminatory
rental practices' and awarded Henry compensation for his increased ex-
1970), was whether materiality should be determined by the jury or by the court.
It was held that when reasonable minds could not differ, the question of materiality
could be decided by the court. Although the judiciary has traditionally used this
standard to withhold issues from the jury, it would appear that the jury is especially
suited to determine whether a reasonable man would or would not have been misled.
Indeed, when a merger may stand or fall on such a fine distinction as the materiality
of information contained in a footnote of a solicitation, perhaps the question of
materiality should always be for the jury.
"5Id. at 1033.
" Perhaps the individual minority shareholder is not so powerful. In Rekant
v. Dresser, 425 F.2d 869, 876 n.7 (5th Cir. 1970), the court noted that although
the individual shareholder has a powerful weapon in section 10(b), he occupies
a fiduciary relationship with other shareholders as a consequence of his bringing
suit. This same fiduciary capacity is presumably shared by the plaintiff-shareholder
in a suit under section 14(a).
, See generally 2 Loss 956-71.
- Mass. -, 256 N.E.2d 311 (1970).
2 See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 152B, §§ 1-10 (1957), which outlines the powers
and duties of the anti-discrimination commission.
- Id. ch. 151B, § 4 (1946), which prohibits discrimination in apartment rental.
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pense in commuting to work, his loss of time and his mental suffering.'
The Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the commission's order.' The
compensation to Mr. Henry for his "considerable frustration, anger, and
humiliation"6 is particularly noteworthy. Mental distress is often the
predominant and sometimes the only injury in discrimination cases,7 and
increased potential for redress of that injury must necessarily affect the
nature and attractiveness of this type of litigation.
Compensation for mental distress in discrimination cases has been
rare," and has usually been based upon statutef Franzaroli is, to a certain
extent, in accord with this norm. The Massachusetts statute prohibiting
discrimination in apartment leasing authorizes an award of
damages not to exceed one thousand dollars, which damages shall in-
clude, but shall not be limited to, the expense incurred by the petitioner
for obtaining alternative housing or space, for storage of goods and
effects, for moving and for other cost actually incurred by him as a
result of such unlawful practice or violation .... 1o
Since the statute does not specifically provide for compensation for mental
distress, the commission's award of such damages may provide precedent
for mental distress damages under similar statutes in other states."
The Massachusetts Supreme Court could have concentrated its at-
tention solely upon the statute and attempted to resolve its neutrality
by an exercise in statutory interpretation. 2 However, the court buttressed
its decision by resorting to common law precedent, 3 thereby broadening
"Id. ch. 151B, § 5 (Supp. Vol. 4-C, 1965), which provides damages for dis-
crimination in apartment leasing.
The superior court had modified the ruling of the commission by deleting
damages. - Mass. -, -, 256 N.E.2d 311, 312 (1970).
Id. at -, 256 N.E.2d at 312.
See Duda, Damages for Mental Suffering in Discriminaiton Cases, 15 CLEV.-
MAR. L. Rnv. 1, 6 (1966).
81 Id. at3.
9See, e.g., Amos v. Prom, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Iowa 1953).
1 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, § 5 (Supp. Vol. 4-C, 1965) (emphasis added).
"'See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1, -2 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 14, § 9 (1963);
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 327.09 (1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4654 (1963);
WAsn. REv. CODE § 9.91.010 (1961).
1 A tenable argument may be made that the criminal fine provided in MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 272, § 92 (1934), enforcing the prohibition against discrimination
in public accommodations in MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 272, § 98 (1934), indicates a
legislative intent to compensate mental distress. Many of the situations covered by
the statute would not involve pecuniary loss for the injured party. See also Craw-
ford v. Robert L. Kent, Inc., 341 Mass. 125, 167 N.E.2d 620 (1960); Bryant v.
Rich's Grill, 216 Mass. 344, 103 N.E. 925 (1914)." - Mass. at -, 256 N.E.2d at 313.
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the scope and import of Franzaroli. Recovery for mental distress has
been allowed in Massachusetts as an aspect of "total compensation" in
cases involving wrongful eviction, 4 unlawful expulsion from school, 5
and wrongful removal from public office.' Arguably, the fact situation
in Franzaroli is distinguishable since original exclusion from a school, a
job, or a home is not as disruptive and harmful as expulsion. Further,
Franzaroli did not involve an existent contractual relationship, violation
of which has been recognized as a basis for mental distress recovery."
Courts have been quite willing to award damages for mental distress
when a recognized cause of action is independently established.' 8 Since
in the fields of housing and public accommodations there is a statutory
right to be free from racial discrimination,' 9 a violation may establish an
independent cause of action of sufficient import to provide a "peg"2 on
which to hang mental distress damages. An analysis of Massachusetts
precedent seems to support this conclusion. In Stiles v. Municipal Council
of Lowell" the Massachusetts court implied that a wrongful act-unlawful
removal from public office-was actionable as a distinct tort2 and recog-
nized mental distress as a "natural consequence" of that act.' Since both
Franzaroli and Stiles relied upon the same line of precedent24 to support
rewards for mental suffering, Franzaroli may reasonably be interpreted
to be based upon the theory of recovery established by the language in
Stiles.
" Fillebrown v. Hoar, 124 Mass. 580 (1878)." Morrison v. Lawrence, 181 Mass. 127, 63 N.E. 400 (1902).
"8 Stiles v. Municipal Council of Lowell, 233 Mass. 174, 123 N.E. 615 (1919).
"' Duff v. Engelberg, 237 Cal. App. 2d 594, 47 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1965) (inter-
ference with contract); Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957)
(breach of contract).
18 Gadsen Gen. Hosp. v. Hamilton, 212 Ala. 531, 103 So. 553 (1925) (false
imprisonment); Trogdon v. Terry, 172 N.C. 540, 90 S.E. 583 (1916) (assault);
Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W. 527 (1884) (battery).
" MAsS. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, § 4 (1946) prohibits discrimination in housing;
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 272, § 98 (1934) prohibits discrimination in public accom-
modations.SO W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTs 44 (3d ed. 1964).
21233 Mass. 174, 123 N.E. 615 (1919).
22 Id. at 184-85, 123 N.E. at 616.
28 "The rule is well settled, however, that if the natural consequence of the
wrongful act, done wilfully or with gross negligence, is mental suffering to the
plaintiff, then that element may be considered in assessing damages." Id. at 185,
123 N.E. at 617.
11 The precedent for each case was Lombard v. Lennox, 155 Mass. 70, 28 N.E.
1125 (1891) ; Fillebrown v. Hoar, 124 Mass. 580 (1878) ; Meagher v. Driscoll, 99
Mass. 281 (1868). See - Mass. -, -, 256 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1970); 233 Mass.
174, 185, 123 N.E. 615, 617-18 (1919).
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A logical and crucial extension of the rationale in Franzaroli is the
availabilty of damages under'the common law tort of intentional infliction
of mental distress.25 When there is no physical impact, manifestation of
physical injury, or other actual damages, mental distress as a distinct tort
may be the only appropriate cause of action. However, the requirements
for recovery for intentional infliction of mental distress are quite rigid.
There 'must be either intentional or reckless disregard for the injured
party's sensibilities, and the emotional harm must be severe. The conduct
causing the injury must be such as a reasonable man would consider "out-
rageous. '26 It is doubtful that'a single *covert act of discrimination un-
accompanied by aggravating conduct would be sufficient to meet the
outrageous"27 or the "severe emotional harm" ' test.
Nevertheless, in determining liability, all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the alleged injury are important; courts have systematically
categorized certain factors and recognized their effect upon recovery.29
One such factor is the peculiar sensitivity of the plairitiff to emotional
harm. Thus in Nickersbn v. Hodgess° an elderly woman, once an inmate
in a mental hospital,'was made the subject of a practical joke. The court,
despite the absence of physical injury, allowed recovery because her age
and state of mind made her vulnerable to the humiliation. Another line
of cases"1 involving pregnant women and persons in poor health is
analytically in accord with the rationale of Hodges. Although a facual
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); see also State Rubbish
CollectionAss'n v. Siliznoff; 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952) ; Great A & P
Tea C6. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931); Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn.
203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926).
" REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
"'But cf. Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954), in which
Justice Fuld provides a reminder that when a man practices discrimination it is
likely that "he will pursue his discriminatory practices in ways that are devious, by
methods subtle and elusive ..... " Id. at 45, 119 N.E.2d at 584.. But see Colley, Civil Action for Damages Arising out of Violations of Civil
Rights, 17 HAsT. L.J. 189 (1965), for a contention that racial discrimination is
"devastating and enduring when inflicted upon adults." Id. at 201.
"E.g., Blecker v. Colo. & S.R.R., 50 Colo. 140, 114 P. 481 (1911) (relation-
ship between common carriers and their passengers); De Wolf v. Ford, 193 N.Y.
397, 86 N.E. 527 (1908) (relationship between innkeepers and their guests)."0 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
"1 Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; Alabama
Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916); Patapasco
Loan Co. v. Hobbs, 129 Md. 9, 98 A. 239 (1916); Continental Casualty Co. v.
Garrett, 173 Miss. 676, 161 So. 753 (1935); National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v.
Anderson, 187 Okla. 180, 102 P.2d 141 (1940) ; Pacific Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tetirick,




distinction is possible since the emotional harm in each ,case had physical
manifestations, no liability would have arisen except for the special
condition of the plaintiffs.
Recognition of peculiar sensitivity to emotional harm seems particularly
pertinent to instances of racial discrimihation, and there is some precedent
that applies this view. In a federal case, 2 involving a Negro woman who
was required to move from a reserved seat to an "all colored" section of
a train, the court alluded to the woman's particular vulnerability to em-
barassment. The court referred to the woman as a lady of "refinement"'
which might, in part, explain her vulnerability in non-racial terms. 4
However, implicit in the case is that the inferior status connoted by
defendant's action could have had an impact only upon the sensibilities of
a Negro.
Of even more significance is Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 1
a recent California case in which a Negro truck driver was subjected
to abusive insults and racial slurs by his employer. The court recog-
nized the special vulnerability of a Negro as a definite factor'to be con-
sidered in determining whether the defendant's conduct was actionable 6
Alcorn, of course, involved more blatant .behavior- than was present in
FranzarolL Furthermore, the plaintiff in Alcorn suffered physical man-
ifestations of his emotional harm. The California court decided that
the-complaint was sufficient to withstand a demurrer, 7 but was in-
conclusiveon whether less culpable behavior would have been actionable.
However, the court did indicate that the presence of physical injury was
not essential to recovery." Since the California extension of peculiar
susceptibility to persons exposed to racial discrimination is rationally
sound, the decision may presage its general recognition in discrimination
cases,
One problem inherent in the application of. the peculiar susceptibility
theory is whether it should be a factor considered in all mental distress
cases involving racial minorities, or whether each case must be considered
2 Solomon v. Pennsylvania R.R., 96 F. Supp. 709 ,(S.D.N.Y. 1951)
8 Id. at 710.
=" The recovery for mental distress may be also rationalized on the basis of the
special obligation which a common carrier owes a passenger. E.g., Wolfe v.
Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co., 2 Ga. App. 499, 58 S.E. 899 (1907); Haile v. 'New
Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 135 La. 230, 65 So. 225 (1914); Gillespie v. Brooklyn
Heights R.R., 178 N.Y. 347, 70 N.E. 857 (1904).
2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
"Id. at -- 468 P.2d at 218-19, 86 Cal, Rptr. at 90-91.
' Id.
"Id. at -, 468 P.2d at 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
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individually to determine if the particular plaintiff is, in fact, peculiarly
susceptible. The California court in Alcorn intimated that the peculiar
susceptibility of a particular plaintiff is a determination to be entrusted
to the trier of fact in the individual case."
The doctrine of peculiar susceptibility serves two functions in cases
involving intentional infliction of mental distress. In determining whether
conduct is "outrageous," defendant's conscious disregard of uniquely
vulnerable sensibilities of a class is one of the factors to be considered.4"
In this respect, the actual susceptibility of the individual plaintiff is not
crucial. For example, subjecting a pregnant woman to a cruel practical
joke is made more culpable because of the woman's condition, irregard-
less of the particular woman's actual vulnerability. If a class is generally
susceptible to a certain type of emotional harm, conduct calculated to
cause that harm is no less blameworthy because the individual plaintiff
fortuitously does not share the general vulnerability.
On the other hand, the second purpose of the peculiar susceptibility
doctrine does depend upon its applicability to the particular plaintiff. The
unusual vulnerability of an individual to a certain type of emotional in-
jury gives assurance of the truthfulness of an allegation of mental dis-
tress.41 For the assurance to be meaningful the actual susceptibility of
the plaintiff must be established. This may be accomplished in the racial
discrimination context, for example, by offering evidence that the plaintiff
has always been sensitive to racial insults. Such evidence is not essential,
though, since the fact that the plaintiff is a Negro is itself evidence of the
likelihood of his susceptibility. Still, the trier of fact must decide, based
upon the class's vulnerability or specific evidence, whether the plaintiff was
actually susceptible.
It is enlightening at this point to probe into the justifications for the
stringent requirements for mental distress damages within the racial
discrimination context. Strict criteria are necessary, for there is a real
danger that mental distress litigation could degenerate into the realm of
the trivial, involving the judicial process in attempts to redress petty
annoyances.4 Insistence upon "outrageousness" mitigates against this
"Id. at - n.4, 468 P.2d at 219 n.4, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 91 n.4.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment f (1965).
6 Id., comment j.
""Adoption of the suggested principle would open up a wide vista of litigation
in the field of bad manners, where relatively minor annoyances had better be dealt
with by instruments of social control other than the law." Magruder, Mental and
Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033, 1035 (1936).
[Vol. 49
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eventuality.43  Conversely, racial discrimination in housing and public
accommodations results in unreasonable denial of access to essential
services. Legislatures, both state and federal, have responded to the critical
nature of this denial by enacting a myriad of civil rights laws 4 reflecting
society's belief that precluding a man, on the basis of his race, from
obtaining housing for his family is a matter of grave concern. Likewise,
the mental distress caused by this discrimination is not the product of a
petty annoyance.
The alleged vagueness and the speculative nature of mental distress
damages have caused courts considerable apprehension.45 By setting up
a very rigid standard, liability is limited to injurious behavior of excep-
tional gravity, thereby minimizing the danger of fictitious claims.46
However, the intense statutory prohibition on discrimination can reason-
ably be interpreted as legislative recognition that acts of discrimination
are harmful; since implicit in an act of discrimination is a connotation of
inferiority, much of that harm must be emotional. The studies of social
scientists have underscored the devastating effects of discrimination;
exemplary is the statement:
Self-hatred and feelings of inferiority are not, of course, rational or
effective responses, but they are among the natural results of the
pressures acting upon a minority group. The suffering which dis-
crimination causes . . . "may be aggravated by consciousness of incur-
ability and even blameworthiness, a self-reproaching which tends to
leave the individual still more aware of his loneliness and unwanted-
ness .... The dominant sociopsychological pressure of color prejudice
seems to produce a collapsing effect upon the individual's self-respect-
to render him ashamed of his existence." 47
In fact, the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion48 recognized and articulated the emotional harm resulting from
discrimination. It is, then, incongruous to have broadly based recog-
"Prosser, In'zdt and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REv. 40, 44 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as Prosser].
"See J. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAw, 372-400 (1959).
""Such injuries are generally more sentimental than substantial." Wadsworth
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 721, 8 S.W. 574, 582 (1888) (dissent-
ing opinion). See also Harned v. E-Z Finance Co., 151 Tex. 641, 649-50, 254
S.W.2d 81, 86-87.
"Prosser, supra note 43, at 44-45.
'7 G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORITIES 217 (1958).
,347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"Chief Justice Warren writing for the Court stated that segregation "generates
,1970]
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nition, including legislative and judicial notice, of the mental suffering
caused by discrimination and still preclude recovery for fear that the
alleged harm is fictitious.
The final concern that must be considered is the possibility of an
unhealthy flood of litigation resulting from the recognition of a new
interest. 0 A finding of fact that racial discrimination has been practiced
is a condition precedeht to recovery for mental distress. Special judicial
machinery has already been established in many states to handle this litiga-
tion." Furthermore, a recent federal case" indicates that damages in dis-
crimination cases do not require a jury trial; mental distress damages could
-therefore be awarded by anti-discrimination commigsions. Such pro-
cedure would place no additional burden upon the courts.
The tort of intentional infliction of mental distress has been carefully
and perhaps prudently circumscribed by the courts. Within the context
of racial discrimination in housing and public accommodations, however,
the rationale behind the strict limitations does not retain validity. Given
this invalidity, a new, more liberal standard should be applied in mental
distress cases in this area. Further, given the appropriateness of the
peculiar susceptibility theory established by Alcorn, recovery for mental
distress may be available under the traditional criteria. Finally, Franzar-
oli provides a rationale for recovery for mental suffering based upon the
independently actionable nature of racial discrimination. On at least one of
these theories, the genuine emotional suffering engendered by discrim-
inatory exclusion from essential services should be compensated.
Coy B. BREWER, JR.
a feeling of inferiority as to [Negro school children's] status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Id. at 494.
"E.g., Simone v..Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 192, 66 A. 202, 204-05 (1907).
For reference to states having commissions against discrimination see 3.
-GREENBERG, RAcE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 384-85 (1959).
"2Rogers v. Loether, 312 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Wis. 1970) ; however, this case
represents a significant break with substantial precedent. See Ross v. Bernhard,
396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 US. 469 (1962); Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). Consequently, the validity of
the case as precedent may be questioned.
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